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Corruption, Clients, and Political Machines: A Response to Professor Issacharoff

Harvard Law Review Forum, Vol. 124, pp. 62-71, 2011

10 Pages Posted: 10 Sep 2011 Last revised: 28 Dec 2014

Stephen E. Sachs

Duke University School of Law

Date Written: September 9, 2011

Abstract

In his comment on political corruption, Professor Samuel Issacharoff questions traditional accounts that aim to squeeze money out of politics entirely. Instead, he focuses on the danger that political spending will promote private influence over government policy. In this response, Professor Stephen E. Sachs argues that "private influence" is itself too broad a category to control, and that campaign finance policy should be restricted to a more manageable scope. Professor Sachs argues that if protecting the government from private influence is too diffuse a goal, we can at least attempt to protect the government from itself, by ensuring that it does not channel public resources into self-sustaining political machines.

Keywords: campaign finance, corruption, clientelism

JEL Classification: H10, K30

Suggested Citation

Sachs, Stephen E., Corruption, Clients, and Political Machines: A Response to Professor Issacharoff (September 9, 2011). Harvard Law Review Forum, Vol. 124, pp. 62-71, 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1713208

Stephen E. Sachs (Contact Author)

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States
919-613-8542 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://law.duke.edu/fac/sachs

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