The Incentive Effects of Appointment Tournaments in German Higher Education

Schmalenbach Business Review, Vol. 62, pp. 378-400, October 2010

23 Pages Posted: 25 Nov 2010

See all articles by Kristin Chlosta

Kristin Chlosta

University of Tuebingen - Department of Business Administration

Kerstin Pull

University of Tuebingen - School of Business and Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 15, 2010

Abstract

In 2001, the German system of higher education underwent reforms that were, among others, intended to raise the incentives for university professors. However, even before the reform, publication records of university German professors showed high output levels over a long period of academic careers. We present one possibility of rationalizing the observed behavior by modeling the incentive effects of appointment tournaments in German higher education. We extend Lazear and Rosen (1981) by allowing for intrinsic motivation applying J-curved effort cost functions and accounting for contestant heterogeneity distinguishing junior academics and professors. We analyze the effects of selected reform elements on the incentives arising from the appointment system.

Keywords: Appointment System, Asymmetric Tournaments, Handicap, Incentives, Intrinsic Motivation, Reform of German Higher Education

JEL Classification: A11, J31, J41, M5, M51

Suggested Citation

Chlosta, Kristin and Pull, Kerstin, The Incentive Effects of Appointment Tournaments in German Higher Education (October 15, 2010). Schmalenbach Business Review, Vol. 62, pp. 378-400, October 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1713668

Kristin Chlosta (Contact Author)

University of Tuebingen - Department of Business Administration ( email )

Mohlstrasse 36
Tuebingen, D-72074
Germany
004970712974916 (Phone)
00497071295077 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/Personal_und_Organisation/

Kerstin Pull

University of Tuebingen - School of Business and Economics ( email )

Nauklerstr. 47
Tuebingen, D-72074
Germany

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