Dynamics of Network Governance: A Contribution to the Study of Complex Forms

REAd: Revista Eletrônica de Administração, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 1-19, 2010

19 Pages Posted: 28 Nov 2010

See all articles by Decio Zylbersztajn

Decio Zylbersztajn

University of Sao Paulo (USP) - Department of Administration

Elizabeth Maria Merc Querido Farina

University of Sao Paulo (USP) - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 18, 2008

Abstract

The focus of this paper is the architecture of complex forms of governance, specifically, the architecture of networks. A network is a complex form of organization designed to govern inter-firm transactions involving horizontal and vertical coordination. The agent´s choice among various institutional arrangements is affected by relation-specific investments, distributive mechanisms, and dynamic aspects based on relational contractual mechanisms, trust being a relevant variable. This paper investigates how horizontal and vertical coordination levels are connected. It recognizes that price incentives are important and introduces the effect of network externalities that also offer incentives. The paper presents a semiformal model that considers the existence of network externalities and applies a game approach to explain the choice among alternative strategies. The conceptual model is applied to two cases of network architecture in agro-industrial relations.

Keywords: Network Governance, Agro-Industrial Networks

Suggested Citation

Zylbersztajn, Decio and Merc Querido Farina, Elizabeth Maria, Dynamics of Network Governance: A Contribution to the Study of Complex Forms (August 18, 2008). REAd: Revista Eletrônica de Administração, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 1-19, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1716302

Decio Zylbersztajn (Contact Author)

University of Sao Paulo (USP) - Department of Administration ( email )

Av. Prof. Luciano Gualberto
908 - Predio 1 Sala C14
Sao Paulo 05508-900
Brazil
55-11-3032-5966 (Phone)
55-11-3032-5966 (Fax)

Elizabeth Maria Merc Querido Farina

University of Sao Paulo (USP) - Department of Economics ( email )

Av. Pádua Dias, 11 - C.P. 9
Sao Paulo SP, 05508-900
Brazil

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