Self-Selection Consistent Choices

24 Pages Posted: 4 Sep 1999

See all articles by Salvador Barberà

Salvador Barberà

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

Carmen Bevia

Universidad de Alicante

Date Written: June 1999

Abstract

This paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous decisions, each one of which is the only concern of some group of individual in society. The need for such rules arises in different contexts, including the establishment of jurisdictions, the location of multiple facilities, or the election of representative committees. We define a notion of allocation consistency requiring that each partial aspect of the global decision taken by society as a whole should be ratified by the group of agents who are directly concerned with this particular aspect. We investigate the possibility of designing allocation consistent rules which satisfy the Condorcet criterion and respect different notions of voluntarism.

JEL Classification: D7, H3

Suggested Citation

Barberà Sàndez, Salvador and Bevia, Carmen, Self-Selection Consistent Choices (June 1999). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=171829 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.171829

Salvador Barberà Sàndez

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona ( email )

Edifici B - Campus Bellaterra
Barcelona, 08193
Spain

Carmen Bevia (Contact Author)

Universidad de Alicante ( email )

Campus de San Vicente, sn
Alicante, 03690
Spain

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