The Vote is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value
47 Pages Posted: 6 Dec 2010 Last revised: 16 Apr 2025
There are 2 versions of this paper
The Vote is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value
Date Written: December 2010
Abstract
This paper estimates the effect of corporate governance provisions on shareholder value and long-term outcomes in S&P1500 firms. We apply a regression discontinuity design to shareholder votes on governance proposals in annual meetings. A close-call vote around the majority threshold is akin to a random outcome, allowing us to deal with prior expectations and the endogeneity of internal governance rules. Passing a corporate governance provision generates a 1.3% abnormal return on the day of the vote with an implied market value per provision of 2.8%. We also find evidence of changes in investment behavior and long-term performance improvements.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation