The Case for Presenteeism

41 Pages Posted: 6 Dec 2010

See all articles by Simen Markussen

Simen Markussen

University of Oslo - Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research

Arnstein Mykletun

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Knut Roed

Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Abstract

Can activation requirements control moral hazard problems in public sickness absence insurance and accelerate recovery? Based on empirical analysis of Norwegian data, we show that it can. Activation requirements not only bring down benefit claims, they also reduce the likelihood that long-term sickness absence leads to inactivity. Our findings show that absentees who are issued graded (partial) absence certificates by their physician have shorter absences and higher subsequent employment rates than they would have had on regular sick leave. We conclude that the activation strategies that in recent years have permeated European and US welfare policy may fruitfully be carried over to sick leave insurance.

Keywords: sick leave, disability, activation, workfare

JEL Classification: C26, I18, I38, J48

Suggested Citation

Markussen, Simen and Mykletun, Arnstein and Røed, Knut, The Case for Presenteeism. IZA Discussion Paper No. 5343. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1720325

Simen Markussen (Contact Author)

University of Oslo - Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research ( email )

Gaustadalleen 21
N-0317 Oslo
Norway

Arnstein Mykletun

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Knut Røed

Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research ( email )

Gaustadalleen 21
N-0349 Oslo
Norway

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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