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Outsourcing Enforcement: Principles to Guide Self-Policing Regimes

Sarah L. Stafford

College of William and Mary - Arts and Sciences; William & Mary Law School

November 17, 2010

Cardozo Law Review, 2011

In his book Outsourcing Sovereignty Paul Verkuil warns us to be wary of the possible threats to accountability and process in what has been a largely unexamined shift from private to public governance. This goal of this article is to examine particular form of outsourcing - the outsourcing of regulatory enforcement to regulated entities themselves, a practice known as self-policing - to determine whether this type of delegation of public power can be justified as being in the public interest. The article presents a case study of the Environmental Protection Agency’s self-policing program, assessing the extent to which it is a defensible form of outsourcing. Additionally the paper reviews a number of other federal self-policing programs and provides a brief assessment of their strengths and weaknesses. Finally, the article concludes with some general guidelines for self-policing programs that can help to minimize concerns about this form of outsourcing.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: Self-Policing, Audit Policy, Voluntary Disclosure, Inherently Governmental Activities, Accountability

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Date posted: December 7, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Stafford, Sarah L., Outsourcing Enforcement: Principles to Guide Self-Policing Regimes (November 17, 2010). Cardozo Law Review, 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1720992

Contact Information

Sarah L. Stafford (Contact Author)
College of William and Mary - Arts and Sciences ( email )
104 E Morton Hall
Williamsburg, VA 23187
United States
William & Mary Law School ( email )
South Henry Street
P.O. Box 8795
Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795
United States
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