Footnotes (444)



The Constitutional Politics of Presidential Succession

Richard Albert

Boston College - Law School; Yale University - Law School

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2011
Boston College Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 242

The current line of presidential succession is no safer than playing presidential roulette. It imprudently privileges politics and tradition over competence and leadership. We should rethink the rules that currently govern succession to the Presidency – legal and constitutional rules that, in my view, serve the wrong institutional and political interests. The task I have given myself in these pages is to propose and defend an alternative to the current presidential succession regime: revising the order of succession to insert former living presidents – in reverse chronological order of service beginning with former presidents of the same party as the unavailable president – into the line of succession and concurrently removing the House Speaker and the Senate President pro tempore from the line of succession. Temporary presidential succession is a promising alternative to the current succession regime for several reasons that I endeavor to justify. Yet even if readers disagree with my proposed alternative to the current line of presidential succession, the larger purpose of my project nevertheless remains achievable: to probe the values that currently shape presidential succession and to invite reflection about whether they are the right ones for our time.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 80

Keywords: Presidential Succession, Presidency, Vice Presidency, Constitution, Constitutional Law, Speaker of the House, Senate President Pro Tempore, Cabinet

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: December 9, 2010 ; Last revised: August 26, 2011

Suggested Citation

Albert, Richard, The Constitutional Politics of Presidential Succession. Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2011; Boston College Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 242. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1722448

Contact Information

Richard Albert (Contact Author)
Boston College - Law School ( email )
885 Centre Street
Boston, MA 02459-1163
United States
617.552.3930 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.richardalbert.com

Yale University - Law School ( email )
P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.richardalbert.com

Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,050
Downloads: 193
Download Rank: 120,887
Footnotes:  444