North-South Technology Transfer in Unionised Multinationals

34 Pages Posted: 9 Dec 2010

See all articles by Kjell Erik Lommerud

Kjell Erik Lommerud

University of Bergen - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Frode Meland

University of Bergen - Department of Economics

Odd Rune Straume

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); University of Minho - Economic Policies Research Unit (NIPE)

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Date Written: December 9, 2010

Abstract

We study how incentives for North-South technology transfers in multinational enterprises are affected by labour market institutions. If workers are collectively organised, incentives for technology transfers are partly governed by firms’ desire to curb trade union power. This will affect not only the extent but also the type of technology transfer. While skill upgrading of southern workers benefits these workers at the expense of northern worker welfare, quality upgrading of products produced in the South may harm not only northern but also southern workers. A minimum wage policy to raise the wage levels of southern workers may spur technology transfer, possibly to the extent that the utility of northern workers decline. These conclusions are reached in a setting where a unionised multinational multiproduct firm produces two vertically differentiated products in northern and southern subsidiaries, respectively.

Keywords: North-South technology transfer, multinationals, trade unions, minimum wages

JEL Classification: F23, J51, O33

Suggested Citation

Lommerud, Kjell Erik and Meland, Frode and Straume, Odd Rune and Straume, Odd Rune, North-South Technology Transfer in Unionised Multinationals (December 9, 2010). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3273, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1722534 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1722534

Kjell Erik Lommerud

University of Bergen - Department of Economics ( email )

Fosswinckelsgt. 6
N-5007 Bergen, 5007
Norway
+47 5 558 9209 (Phone)
+47 5 558 9210 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Frode Meland

University of Bergen - Department of Economics ( email )

Fosswinckelsgt. 6
N-5007 Bergen, 5007
Norway
+47 5 558 9230 (Phone)
+47 5 558 9210 (Fax)

Odd Rune Straume (Contact Author)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

University of Minho - Economic Policies Research Unit (NIPE) ( email )

Campus de Gualtar
Braga, 4710-057
Portugal

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