Complications in the Antitrust Response to Monopsony

Jeffrey Lynch Harrison

University of Florida - Levin College of Law

December 9, 2010

The general idea of treating monopoly and monopsony similarly under the antitrust laws is supported by economic theory but is somewhat more complicated when one attempts to apply existing legal standards. The focus here is on some of the stickier issues that arise when antitrust is applied to monopsony. This analysis starts with a short review of monopsony theory. The purpose is to provide a context for the specific issues that are addressed in the following sections. The first complication concerns what is called the β€œall none supply curve.” This amounts to an argument that in some circumstances, monopsony may not be harmful. It then explores questions left open by Weyerhaeuser, issues of antitrust standing (a decision about those eligible to bring a private action based on a monopsony theory), the treatment of cooperative buying, and, finally, the treatment of monopsony in the context of some practices to which the application of United States antitrust law is currently somewhat muddled.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 18

Keywords: Antitrust, Monopsony

JEL Classification: K21

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Date posted: December 10, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Harrison, Jeffrey Lynch, Complications in the Antitrust Response to Monopsony (December 9, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1722687 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1722687

Contact Information

Jeffrey Lynch Harrison (Contact Author)
University of Florida - Levin College of Law ( email )
P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States

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