The Impact of Timing on Bidding Behavior in Procurement Auctions of Contracts with Private Costs

22 Pages Posted: 12 Dec 2010

See all articles by Dakshina G. De Silva

Dakshina G. De Silva

Lancaster University - Department of Economics

Georgia Kosmopoulou

University of Oklahoma - Department of Economics

Beatrice Pagel

German Institute for Economic Research, (DIW Berlin)

Ronald Peeters

University of Otago

Date Written: October 18, 2010

Abstract

We provide a comparison of bidding behavior between multi-round and single-round auctions considering bid lettings for asphalt construction contracts. Using a reduced-form difference-in-difference approach as well as the nonparametric estimation technique proposed by Racine and Li (2004) we find that, bidding is more aggressive in a sequential multi-round setting than in a simultaneous single-round format. We explore potential causes for the bidding difference across formats related to synergies and level of bidder participation.

Keywords: Multi-unit auctions, Procurement auctions

JEL Classification: D44, H57

Suggested Citation

De Silva, Dakshina G. and Kosmopoulou, Georgia and Pagel, Beatrice and Peeters, Ronald, The Impact of Timing on Bidding Behavior in Procurement Auctions of Contracts with Private Costs (October 18, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1722842 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1722842

Dakshina G. De Silva

Lancaster University - Department of Economics ( email )

Georgia Kosmopoulou

University of Oklahoma - Department of Economics ( email )

633 Elm Avenue
306 Ellison Hall
Norman, OK 73019
United States
405-325-3083 (Phone)
405-325-5842 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://georgiakosmopoulou.oucreate.com/

Beatrice Pagel

German Institute for Economic Research, (DIW Berlin) ( email )

Mohrenstraße 58
Berlin, 10117
Germany

Ronald Peeters (Contact Author)

University of Otago ( email )

Department of Economics
P.O. Box 56
Dunedin, Otago 9054
New Zealand

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