Incentive Effects of Bonus Taxes in a Principal-Agent Model
University of Zurich Institute for Strategy and Business Economics Working Paper No. 140
29 Pages
Posted: 12 Dec 2010
Last revised: 17 Aug 2012
University of Zurich - Department of Business Administration (IBW)
University of Zurich
University of Zurich - Department of Business Administration (IBW)
University of Zurich - Department of Business Administration (IBW)
Date Written: December 11, 2010
Abstract
Several countries have implemented bonus taxes for corporate executives in response to the financial crisis of 2007-2010. Using a principal-agent model, this paper investigates the incentive effects of bonus taxes by analyzing the agent's and principal's behavior. Specifically, we show how bonus taxes affect the agent's incentives to exert effort and the principal's decision regarding the composition of the compensation package (fixed salary and bonus rate). We find that, surprisingly, a bonus tax can increase the bonus rate and decrease the fixed salary. In addition, a bonus tax can induce the principal to pay higher bonuses even though the agent's effort always decreases.
Keywords: Principal-agent model, bonus tax, executive compensation, incentive, pay regulation
JEL Classification: H24, J30, M52
Suggested Citation:
Suggested Citation
Dietl, Helmut M. and Grossmann, Martin and Lang, Markus and Wey, Simon, Incentive Effects of Bonus Taxes in a Principal-Agent Model (December 11, 2010). University of Zurich Institute for Strategy and Business Economics Working Paper No. 140. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1723907 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1723907
