The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions

51 Pages Posted: 13 Dec 2010 Last revised: 10 Jun 2021

See all articles by Robert H. Porter

Robert H. Porter

Northwestern University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: October 1992


This paper describes the U.S. offshore oil and gas lease sales, conducted by the Department of the Interior since 1954. Several decision problems are discussed, including bidding for leases, the government's decision whether to accept the highest bid, the incidence and timing of exploratory drilling, and the formation of bidding consortia. It is argued that equilibrium models that emphasize informational and strategic issues, and that account for institutional features of the leasing program, provide accurate predictions of outcomes.

Suggested Citation

Porter, Robert H., The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions (October 1992). NBER Working Paper No. w4185, Available at SSRN:

Robert H. Porter (Contact Author)

Northwestern University - Department of Economics ( email )

2003 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-3491 (Phone)
847-491-7001 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
PlumX Metrics