The Role of Publicity Requirements on Entry and Auctions Outcomes

36 Pages Posted: 16 Dec 2010 Last revised: 2 Mar 2014

Date Written: December 16, 2010

Abstract

Using a regression discontinuity design, we document the effect of publicizing a procurement auction on entry and outcomes. We collect a large sample of procurement auctions, which by Italian law are assigned different publicity levels on the basis of their reserve price. We find that auctions publicized at the regional level have more bidders and higher winning rebates compared to auctions that are publicized on the notice board of the public administration managing the auction. Regionally-publicized auctions are also more likely to be won by bidders from outside the region, less likely to be won by small companies, and the same firm is more likely to win repeated auctions. Taken together, our results suggest that publicity informs more bidders and reduces search and preparation costs, which encourages entry and “improves” procurement.

Keywords: Publicity, Entry, Auctions, Regression Discontinuity

JEL Classification: D02, D44, C31, L11

Suggested Citation

Coviello, Decio and Mariniello, Mario, The Role of Publicity Requirements on Entry and Auctions Outcomes (December 16, 2010). CEIS Working Paper No. 180, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1726343 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1726343

Decio Coviello (Contact Author)

HEC Montreal ( email )

3000, chemin de la Cote-Saint-Catherine,
montreal, Quebec H2V3P7
Canada

Mario Mariniello

Bruegel ( email )

Rue de la Charité 33
B-1210 Brussels Belgium, 1210
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.bruegel.org/scholars/scholar-detail/scholar/320-mario-mariniello/

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