Policy Repercussions of 'The New Economics of the Brain Drain'

Oded Stark

University of Bonn; University of Warsaw; University of Tuebingen; Georgetown University

December 16, 2010

ZEF Discussion Papers on Development Policy No. 145

In this paper I delineate novel policy repercussions suggested by my research on “The New Economics of the Brain Drain.” In section 1, I provide a succinct account of the model that inspires the derivation of several new policy implications. In sections 2 through 5, I present the policy implications. I address the following questions: When and how can migration to a country substitute for educational subsidies in that country? Who should be admitted when the receiving country cares about the wellbeing of the unskilled workers who stay behind in the sending country? How and why the incentives to form human capital in the sending country will have a paradoxical effect on the migration policy of the receiving country? How and why will the level of a separating tax imposed by the destination country be reduced by the human capital formation calculus in the sending country? I conclude that the policy implications delineated in the paper illustrate the power and appeal of “The New Economics of the Brain Drain” as a framework for rethinking the formation of sound policy responses to migration.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 15

Keywords: The New Economics of the Brain Drain, Policy formation

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Date posted: December 18, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Stark, Oded, Policy Repercussions of 'The New Economics of the Brain Drain' (December 16, 2010). ZEF Discussion Papers on Development Policy No. 145. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1726380 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1726380

Contact Information

Oded Stark (Contact Author)
University of Bonn ( email )
Walter-Flex-Str. 3
Bonn, NRW 53113
University of Warsaw ( email )
Dluga Street 44/50
Warsaw, 00-241
University of Tuebingen
Wilhelmstr. 19
Tuebingen, Baden Wuerttemberg 72074
Georgetown University ( email )
Washington, DC 20057
United States
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