Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature

Oxford University Economics Working Paper No. 1999-W12

88 Pages Posted: 4 Sep 1999

See all articles by Paul Klemperer

Paul Klemperer

University of Oxford - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Date Written: May 1999

Abstract

This paper provides an elementary, non-technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. (The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.), forthcoming.) We begin with the most fundamental concepts, and then introduce the basic analysis of optimal auctions, the revenue equivalence theorem, and marginal revenues. Subsequent sections address risk-aversion, affiliation, asymmetries, entry, collusion, multi-unit auctions, double auctions, royalties, incentive contracts, and other topics. Appendices contain technical details, some simple worked examples, and bibliographies.

JEL Classification: D44

Suggested Citation

Klemperer, Paul, Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature (May 1999). Oxford University Economics Working Paper No. 1999-W12. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=172650 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.172650

Paul Klemperer (Contact Author)

University of Oxford - Department of Economics ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

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