Corruption and Political Competition

14 Pages Posted: 18 Dec 2010

See all articles by Richard Damania

Richard Damania

World Bank; University of Adelaide - School of Economics

Erkan Yalçin

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: 2008

Abstract

There is a growing evidence that political corruption is often closely associated with the rent seeking activities of special interest groups. This paper examines the nature of the interaction between the lobbying activities of special interest groups and the incidence of political corruption and determines whether electoral competition can eliminate political corruption. We obtain some striking results. Greater electoral competition serves to lessen policy distortions. However, this in turn stimulates more intense lobbying which increases the scope of corrupt behavior. It is shown that electoral competition merely serves to alter the type of corruption that eventuates, but cannot eliminate it.

Keywords: Corruption, lobbying, political competition

JEL Classification: D72, D73

Suggested Citation

Damania, Richard and Yalçin, Erkan, Corruption and Political Competition (2008). Economics Discussion Paper No. 2008-7. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1726705 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1726705

Richard Damania (Contact Author)

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States

University of Adelaide - School of Economics ( email )

Adelaide SA, 5005
Australia
+61 8 8303 4933 (Phone)
+61 8 8223 1460 (Fax)

Erkan Yalçin

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

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