Spiders and Snakes: Offshoring and Agglomeration in the Global Economy

25 Pages Posted: 18 Dec 2010 Last revised: 23 May 2021

See all articles by Richard Baldwin

Richard Baldwin

Graduate Institute, Geneva; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Anthony J. Venables

University of Oxford; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: December 2010

Abstract

Global production sharing is determined by international cost differences and frictions related to the costs of unbundling stages spatially. The interaction between these forces depends on engineering details of the production process with two extremes being 'snakes' and 'spiders'. Snakes are processes whose sequencing is dictated by engineering; spiders involve the assembly of parts in no particular order. This paper studies spatial unbundling as frictions fall, showing that outcomes are very different for snakes and spiders, even if they share some features. Both snakes and spiders have in common a property that lower frictions produce discontinuous location changes and 'overshooting'. Parts may move against their comparative costs because of proximity benefits, and further reductions in frictions lead these parts to be 'reshored'. Predictions for trade volumes and the number of fragmented stages are quite different in the two cases. For spiders, a part crosses borders at most twice; the value of trade increases monotonically as frictions fall, except when the assembler relocates and the direction of parts trade is reversed. For snakes the volume of trade and number of endogenously determined stages is bounded only by the fragmentation of the underlying engineering process, and lower frictions monotonically increase trade volumes.

Suggested Citation

Baldwin, Richard and Venables, Anthony J., Spiders and Snakes: Offshoring and Agglomeration in the Global Economy (December 2010). NBER Working Paper No. w16611, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1727092

Richard Baldwin (Contact Author)

Graduate Institute, Geneva ( email )

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Anthony J. Venables

University of Oxford ( email )

Mansfield Road
Oxford, Oxfordshire OX1 4AU
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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