A Behavioral Model of Demandable Deposits and its Implications for Financial Regulation

48 Pages Posted: 18 Dec 2010 Last revised: 30 Nov 2024

See all articles by Julio J. Rotemberg

Julio J. Rotemberg

Harvard University, Business, Government and the International Economy Unit (deceased); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) (deceased)

Date Written: December 2010

Abstract

A model is developed which rationalizes contracts that give depositors the right to obtain funds on demand even when depositors intend to use these funds for consumption in the future. This is explained by depositor overoptimism regarding their own ability to collect funds in a run. Capitalized institutions serving depositors with such beliefs emerge in equilibrium even if depositors and bank owners have the same preferences and the same investment opportunities. Various government regulations of these institutions, including minimum capital levels, requirements concerning the assets they may hold, deposit insurance and compulsory clawbacks in bankruptcy can raise the average ex post welfare of depositors.

Suggested Citation

Rotemberg, Julio J., A Behavioral Model of Demandable Deposits and its Implications for Financial Regulation (December 2010). NBER Working Paper No. w16620, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1727100

Julio J. Rotemberg (Contact Author)

Harvard University, Business, Government and the International Economy Unit (deceased) ( email )

Cambridge, MA
United States
617-495-1015 (Phone)
617-496-5994 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) (deceased)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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