On the Construction of Social Preferences in Lab Experiments

33 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2010

See all articles by Sarah Borgloh

Sarah Borgloh

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Astrid Dannenberg

University of Gothenburg

Bodo Aretz

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Date Written: 2010

Abstract

This paper studies the construction of social preferences in the lab. Experimental subjects have the opportunity to donate to a charity and to allocate money in a conventional dictator game. The results show that charitable donations and dictator game allocations are positively correlated. The correlation is only significant, however, if the dictator game follows the donation decision. Furthermore, while donation behavior is independent from the order of play, dictator game behavior is not. In line with the constructive-preference approach, we argue that preferences are instable and sensitive to outside influences when subjects are confronted with a new decision situation, while in a well-known situation preferences are more stable.

Keywords: social preferences, charitable donations, dictator game, experiment

JEL Classification: C91, C93, D01, D64

Suggested Citation

Borgloh, Sarah and Dannenberg, Astrid and Aretz, Bodo, On the Construction of Social Preferences in Lab Experiments (2010). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 10-085, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1727398 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1727398

Sarah Borgloh (Contact Author)

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

Astrid Dannenberg

University of Gothenburg ( email )

Viktoriagatan 30
Göteborg, 405 30
Sweden

Bodo Aretz

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

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