Political Competition vs. Political Participation: Effects on Government's Size

Economics of Governance volume 13, pages333–363 (2012)

30 Pages Posted: 22 Dec 2010 Last revised: 24 Aug 2022

See all articles by Dalibor S. Eterovic

Dalibor S. Eterovic

Columbia Business School; The Rohatyn Group

Nicolas A. Eterovic

Central Bank of Chile

Date Written: December 17, 2010

Abstract

From a theoretical standpoint, there are reasons to believe that political competition and political participation might have opposite effects on the size of government. We investigate empirically this possibility using data from a panel of 104 countries from 1960. We find that reforms enhancing political competition tend to limit the size of government, while reforms increasing political participation tend to increase the size of government. These results are robust for the global sample and across different regions. Controlling for the existence and enforcement of compulsory voting laws does not affect our main results.

Our findings reinforce the empirical relevance of the distinction between political competition and participation.

Keywords: Political competition, political participation, compulsory voting, size of government

JEL Classification: D7, H11

Suggested Citation

Eterovic, Dalibor S. and Eterovic, Nicolas A., Political Competition vs. Political Participation: Effects on Government's Size (December 17, 2010). Economics of Governance volume 13, pages333–363 (2012), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1727564 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1727564

Dalibor S. Eterovic (Contact Author)

Columbia Business School ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
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The Rohatyn Group ( email )

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Nicolas A. Eterovic

Central Bank of Chile ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://https://www.bcentral.cl/web/banco-central/investigadores/nicolas-eterovic

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