51 Pages Posted: 18 Dec 2010 Last revised: 22 May 2013
Date Written: March 7, 2011
This paper examines the relation between corporate ownership structure and bank loan syndicate structure. We find that the divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights of a borrowing firm's largest ultimate owner has a significant impact on the concentration and composition of the firm’s loan syndicate. When the control-ownership divergence is large, lead arrangers form syndicates with structures that facilitate enhanced due diligence and monitoring efforts. These syndicates tend to be relatively concentrated and comprised of domestic banks that are geographically close to the borrowing firms and that have lending expertise related to the industries of the borrowers. We also examine factors that influence the relation between ownership structure and syndicate structure, including firm opacity, presence of multiple large owners, bank reputation, lending relationship, law and institution, and financial crises.
Keywords: Ownership Structure, Syndicated Loan, Excess Control Rights
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Lin, Chen and Ma, (马跃) Yue and Malatesta, Paul H. and Xuan, Yuhai, Corporate Ownership Structure and Bank Loan Syndicate Structure (March 7, 2011). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Vol. 104, No. 1, 2012; AFA 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1727752 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1727752