To Be or Not to Be in Monetary Union: A Synthesis
37 Pages Posted: 20 Dec 2010
Date Written: December 1, 2010
Abstract
Monetary union can benefit countries suffering from policy credibility problems if it eliminates the inflation bias and also allows for more efficient management of certain shocks. But it also carries costs as some stabilization may be feasible even in the absence of credibility, and this may be more than what an individual country can hope for in a monetary union. In this paper, we combine the stabilization and credibility branches of the currency union literature and construct a simple welfare criterion that can be used to evaluate alternative monetary arrangements. We produce examples where monetary union may be welfare improving even for low-modest levels of inflation bias (2-3%) as long as business cycles are not too a-synchronized across countries.
Keywords: Currency union, credibility, stabilization, inflation bias
JEL Classification: E4, E5, F4
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Recommended Papers
-
By Maurice Obstfeld and Alan C. Stockman
-
By Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff
-
Can Sticky Price Models Generate Volatile and Persistent Real Exchange Rates?
By Varadarajan V. Chari, Patrick J. Kehoe, ...
-
Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Volatility in a Small Open Economy
By Jordi Galí and Tommaso Monacelli
-
Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Volatility in a Small Open Economy
By Jordi Galí and Tommaso Monacelli
-
Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Volatility in a Small Open Economy
By Jordi Galí and Tommaso Monacelli
-
New Directions for Stochastic Open Economy Models
By Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff
-
Monetary Policy in the Open Economy Revisited: Price Setting and Exchange Rate Flexibility