Road Pricing as a Citizen-Candidate Game

European Transport/Trasporti Europei, No. 31, pp. 28-45, 2005

18 Pages Posted: 20 Dec 2010  

Edoardo Marcucci

Università degli Studi di Urbino, "Carlo Bo"

Marco A. Marini

University of Rome La Sapienza; CREI, University Rome III

Davide Ticchi

IMT Institute for Advanced Studies

Date Written: 2005

Abstract

We construct a political economy model to analyze the political acceptability of road pricing policies. We use a citizen-candidate framework with a population composed by three groups differing for their income level. We show that road pricing policies are never applied when there is no redistribution of the resources in favour of other modes of transport or when the congestion of these types of transport is relatively high. The results suggest that the efficiency of the redistribution of resources from road to the alternative types of transport as well as the fraction of the population that uses the road transport are key factors in explaining the adoption of road pricing schemes.

Keywords: Road pricing; Political acceptability; Citizen-candidate.

JEL Classification: L90, L91, L92

Suggested Citation

Marcucci, Edoardo and Marini, Marco A. and Ticchi, Davide, Road Pricing as a Citizen-Candidate Game (2005). European Transport/Trasporti Europei, No. 31, pp. 28-45, 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1728758

Edoardo Marcucci

Università degli Studi di Urbino, "Carlo Bo" ( email )

61029 Urbino
Italy
+39+348+0687535 (Phone)
+06+5127788 (Fax)

Marco A. Marini (Contact Author)

University of Rome La Sapienza ( email )

Piazzale Aldo Moro, 5
Rome, 00181
Italy
+39 06 49910843 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.dis.uniroma1.it/marini/

CREI, University Rome III ( email )

Via Ostiense, 161
Rome, 00154
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://host.uniroma3.it/centri/crei/

Davide Ticchi

IMT Institute for Advanced Studies ( email )

Complesso San Micheletto
Lucca, 55100
Italy

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