Dynamical Pattern in a 2 × 2 Game with Human Subjects (Chinese)
12 Pages Posted: 12 May 2011
Date Written: December 21, 2010
Abstract
In the two-dimensions’ strategy space of a two-populations society, social should be jumping or stop at each moment. From a 2 × 2 game of experimental economics laboratory data, we measure the mean velocity of the jumping at each point of the strategy space. We find that the velocity vector field is in a cycle pattern, at the same time, unbalanced (beyond detailed balance condition) jumping’s distribution is in a ring-mountain form.
Note: Downloadable document is in Chinese.
Keywords: Experimental Economics, Time Reversal, Velocity Field, Stationary Non-Equilibrium State, Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium, Evolutionary Game Theory, Matching Pennies Game, Detailed Balance Condition, Time Reversal Antisymmetry, Payoff Vector, Markov Processes, Edgeworth Cycle, Shapley Polygon
JEL Classification: C70, C73, C91, C72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation