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Dynamical Pattern in a 2 × 2 Game with Human Subjects (Chinese)

12 Pages Posted: 12 May 2011  

Bin Xu

Zhejiang Gongshang University (ZJGSU) - School of Public Administration

Zhijian Wang

Zhejiang University - Experimental Social Science Laboratory

Date Written: December 21, 2010

Abstract

In the two-dimensions’ strategy space of a two-populations society, social should be jumping or stop at each moment. From a 2 × 2 game of experimental economics laboratory data, we measure the mean velocity of the jumping at each point of the strategy space. We find that the velocity vector field is in a cycle pattern, at the same time, unbalanced (beyond detailed balance condition) jumping’s distribution is in a ring-mountain form.

Notes: Downloadable document is in Chinese.

Keywords: Experimental Economics, Time Reversal, Velocity Field, Stationary Non-Equilibrium State, Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium, Evolutionary Game Theory, Matching Pennies Game, Detailed Balance Condition, Time Reversal Antisymmetry, Payoff Vector, Markov Processes, Edgeworth Cycle, Shapley Polygon

JEL Classification: C70, C73, C91, C72

Suggested Citation

Xu, Bin and Wang, Zhijian, Dynamical Pattern in a 2 × 2 Game with Human Subjects (Chinese) (December 21, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1729129 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1729129

Bin Xu

Zhejiang Gongshang University (ZJGSU) - School of Public Administration ( email )

Hangzhou, Zhejiang 310018
China

Zhijian Wang (Contact Author)

Zhejiang University - Experimental Social Science Laboratory ( email )

38 Zheda Road
312, Dongsan, Zijingang
Hangzhou 310027, Zhejiang 310058
China

HOME PAGE: http://socexp.zju.edu.cn

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