Footnotes (62)



Agency Hygiene

Nicholas Bagley

University of Michigan Law School

November 20, 2010

Texas Law Review See Also, Vol. 8, p. 1, 2010
U of Michigan Public Law Working Paper No. 224

Rachel Barkow's important article on structuring agencies to insulate them from interest-group capture leaves largely unanswered the problem of what to do with an agency that has already been captured. Although nothing in principle prevents Congress from reshaping existing agencies along the lines she suggests, experience suggests that we might wait a very long time for Congress to enact structural reforms.

To eliminate capture that has already taken hold, the political branches need two things: good information and political will. They need information in order to identify capture where it occurs, to understand the contours of the relevant capture dynamic, and to suggest agency-specific strategies for ameliorating capture. More significantly, the political branches also need the will to implement those strategies even in the face of stiff resistance from well-funded groups with a potent interest in perpetuating the status quo. Although information and political will are in short supply, they need not be. Congress can and should establish a body housed within the Executive Branch and vested with the authority to investigate allegations of capture and document the existence of capture dynamics where they arise. Adequately funded and appropriately staffed, this body would coordinate with offices of inspectors general across the federal bureaucracy to identify capture where it occurs. At the same time, Congress should create legislative mechanisms to spur action on the recommendations of this newly instituted body.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 15

Keywords: Agency capture

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Date posted: December 22, 2010 ; Last revised: August 19, 2011

Suggested Citation

Bagley, Nicholas, Agency Hygiene (November 20, 2010). Texas Law Review See Also, Vol. 8, p. 1, 2010; U of Michigan Public Law Working Paper No. 224. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1729247

Contact Information

Nicholas Bagley (Contact Author)
University of Michigan Law School ( email )
625 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215
United States

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