15 Pages Posted: 22 Dec 2010
Date Written: June 22, 2010
We show that a mechanism that robustly implements optimal outcomes in a one-dimensional supermodular environment continues to robustly implement ε-optimal outcomes in all close-by environments. Robust implementation of ε-optimal outcomes is thus robust to small perturbations of the environment. This is in contrast to ex-post implementation which is not robust in this sense as only trivial social choice functions are ex-post implementable in generic environments.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Meyer-Ter-Vehn, Moritz and Morris, Stephen, The Robustness of Robust Implementation (June 22, 2010). Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 002-2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1729268 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1729268