24 Pages Posted: 26 Dec 2010 Last revised: 11 Jun 2014
Date Written: May 25, 2014
We investigate the incentives for vertical and horizontal integration in the financial securities service industry. Our analysis shows that the incentives for vertical integration depend on industry characteristics revealing, for example, that incentives increase in the demand for liquidity. Decentralized decisions might lead to an industry equilibrium with lower aggregate profits for all participants. This problem can be overcome by horizontal integration. We link our results to recent regulatory and institutional developments, and argue that multilateral trading facilities and algorithmic trading lead to lower incentives for vertical integration whereas the regulatory push towards mandatory clearing of over-the-counter trades increases the profitability of vertical integration.
Keywords: Vertical Integration, Horizontal Integration, Competition, Trading, Settlement
JEL Classification: G15, L13, L22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Juranek, Steffen and Walz, Uwe, Organizational Design, Competition, and Financial Exchanges (May 25, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1730152 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1730152
By Karlo Kauko