Do Implicit Barriers Matter for Globalization?

64 Pages Posted: 23 Dec 2010 Last revised: 14 Jun 2013

See all articles by Francesca Carrieri

Francesca Carrieri

McGill University - Desautels Faculty of Management

Ines Chaieb

University of Geneva - Geneva Finance Research Institute (GFRI); Swiss Finance Institute

Vihang R. Errunza

McGill University - Desautels Faculty of Management

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 2011

Abstract

Market liberalization may not result in global pricing or full market integration if implicit barriers are important. We test this proposition for 22 emerging markets using the conditional version of Errunza and Losq (1985) model. We estimate and compare the degree of integration for stocks that are eligible for purchase by foreigners (investible) and those that are not (non-investible). Our results show that local factors are priced for both segments and the implicit barriers are significantly associated with the integration measure. Specifically, better institutions, stronger corporate governance and more transparent markets would jointly contribute to a higher degree of integration by about 15-20 percent.

Keywords: International Asset Pricing, Emerging Markets, Market Integration, Liberalization, Globalization

JEL Classification: G15, F30, G30

Suggested Citation

Carrieri, Francesca and Chaieb, Ines and Errunza, Vihang R., Do Implicit Barriers Matter for Globalization? (August 2011). Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 10-55, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1730206 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1730206

Francesca Carrieri

McGill University - Desautels Faculty of Management ( email )

1001 Sherbrooke St. West
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Ines Chaieb (Contact Author)

University of Geneva - Geneva Finance Research Institute (GFRI) ( email )

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Switzerland
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Swiss Finance Institute

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Vihang R. Errunza

McGill University - Desautels Faculty of Management ( email )

1001 Sherbrooke St. West
Montreal, Quebec H3A1G5 H3A 2M1
Canada
514-398-4056 (Phone)
514-398-3876 (Fax)

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