Government Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis
22 Pages Posted: 1 Jan 2011
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Government Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis
Government Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis
Abstract
Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Our results show that expenditure decentralization reduces the number of transnational terror events in a country, while political decentralization has no impact. These results are robust to the choice of control variables and method of estimation.
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