Government Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis

22 Pages Posted: 1 Jan 2011

See all articles by Axel Dreher

Axel Dreher

Heidelberg University

Justina A.V. Fischer

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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Abstract

Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Our results show that expenditure decentralization reduces the number of transnational terror events in a country, while political decentralization has no impact. These results are robust to the choice of control variables and method of estimation.

Suggested Citation

Dreher, Axel and Fischer, Justina A.V., Government Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis. International Economic Review, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 981-1002, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1732986 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00608.x

Axel Dreher (Contact Author)

Heidelberg University ( email )

Grabengasse 1
Heidelberg, 69117
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.axel-dreher.de

Justina A.V. Fischer

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

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