Government Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis

Dreher, Axel; Fischer, Justina A.V.

doi:10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00608.x

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Government Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis

International Economic Review, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 981-1002, 2010

22 Pages Posted: 1 Jan 2011

See all articles by Axel Dreher

Justina A.V. Fischer

affiliation not provided to SSRN

There are 3 versions of this paper

Abstract

Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Our results show that expenditure decentralization reduces the number of transnational terror events in a country, while political decentralization has no impact. These results are robust to the choice of control variables and method of estimation.

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Dreher, Axel and Fischer, Justina A.V., Government Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis. International Economic Review, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 981-1002, 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1732986 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00608.x