Making Talk Cheap (and Problems Easy): How Legal and Political Institutions Can Facilitate Consensus

18 Pages Posted: 3 Jan 2011

See all articles by Cheryl Boudreau

Cheryl Boudreau

University of California, Davis

Mathew D. McCubbins

Department of Political Science and Law School, Duke University

Daniel B. Rodriguez

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law

Nicholas Weller

University of California, Riverside (UCR)

Date Written: November 18, 2010

Abstract

In many legal, political, and social settings, people must reach a consensus before particular outcomes can be achieved and failing to reach a consensus may be costly. In this article, we present a theory and conduct experiments that take into account the costs associated with communicating, as well as the difficulty of the decisions that groups make. We find that when there is even a small cost (relative to the potential benefit) associated with sending information to others and/or listening, groups are much less likely to reach a consensus, primarily because they are less willing to communicate with one another. We also find that difficult problems significantly reduce group members willingness to communicate with one another and, therefore, hinder their ability to reach a consensus.

Suggested Citation

Boudreau, Cheryl and McCubbins, Mathew D. and Rodriguez, Daniel B. and Weller, Nicholas, Making Talk Cheap (and Problems Easy): How Legal and Political Institutions Can Facilitate Consensus (November 18, 2010). Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Vol. 7, Issue 4, pp. 868-885, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1733793 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-1461.2010.01198.x

Cheryl Boudreau (Contact Author)

University of California, Davis ( email )

One Shields Avenue
Davis, CA 95616
United States

Mathew D. McCubbins

Department of Political Science and Law School, Duke University ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States

Daniel B. Rodriguez

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law ( email )

375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States

Nicholas Weller

University of California, Riverside (UCR) ( email )

900 University Avenue
Riverside, CA 92521
United States

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