Financial Constraints on Corporate Goodness

49 Pages Posted: 4 Jan 2011 Last revised: 26 Apr 2012

Harrison G. Hong

Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jeffrey D. Kubik

Syracuse University - Department of Economics

Jose A. Scheinkman

Columbia University; Princeton University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2, 2012

Abstract

An influential thesis, dubbed "Doing Well by Doing Good", argues that corporate social responsibility is profitable. We establish that, if anything, the reverse is true: firms do good only when they do well in the sense of having financial slack. We model a firm's optimal choices of capital and goodness subject to financial constraints. Less-constrained firms spend more on goodness. We verify that in the data less constrained firms indeed have higher goodness scores and establish causality by using a quasi-experiment. During the Internet bubble, previously constrained firms experienced a temporary relaxation of their constraints and their goodness also temporarily increased relative to their previously unconstrained peers. Goodness is also more sensitive to financial constraints than capital or R\&D spending.

Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility, Socially Responsible Investing, Financial Constraints, Financial Slack, Externalities, Public Goods

JEL Classification: G30, H40, L20

Suggested Citation

Hong, Harrison G. and Kubik, Jeffrey D. and Scheinkman, Jose A., Financial Constraints on Corporate Goodness (February 2, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1734164 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1734164

Harrison G. Hong (Contact Author)

Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics ( email )

420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Jeffrey D. Kubik

Syracuse University - Department of Economics ( email )

426 Eggers Hall
Syracuse, NY 13244-1020
United States
315-443-9063 (Phone)
315-443-1081 (Fax)

Jose A. Scheinkman

Columbia University ( email )

420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.princeton.edu/~joses

Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )

26 Prospect Avenue
Princeton, NJ 08544
United States
609-258-4020 (Phone)
609-258-6419 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.princeton.edu/~joses

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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