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The Effect of Tracking Students by Ability into Different Schools: A Natural Experiment


Nina Guyon


National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics; National University of Singapore

Eric Maurin


Paris School of Economics (PSE); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Sandra McNally


London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

January 5, 2011

FEEM Working Paper No. 152.2010

Abstract:     
The tracking of pupils by ability into elite and non-elite schools represents a controversial policy in many countries. There is no consensus on how large the elite track should be and little agreement on the effects of any further increase in its size. This paper presents a natural experiment where the increase in the size of the elite track was followed by a significant improvement in average educational outcomes. This experiment provides a rare opportunity to isolate the overall effect of allowing entry to the elite track for a group that was previously only at the margin of being admitted.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

Keywords: Education, Tracking, Selection

JEL Classification: I2


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Date posted: January 8, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Guyon, Nina and Maurin, Eric and McNally, Sandra, The Effect of Tracking Students by Ability into Different Schools: A Natural Experiment (January 5, 2011). FEEM Working Paper No. 152.2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1735337 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1735337

Contact Information

Nina Guyon
National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics ( email )
1 Arts Link, AS2 #06-02
Singapore 117570, Singapore 119077
Singapore
National University of Singapore ( email )
Department of Economics
Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences
Singapore, 117570
Singapore
HOME PAGE: http://www.fas.nus.edu.sg/ecs/
Eric Maurin (Contact Author)
Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )
48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France
IZA Institute of Labor Economics
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Sandra McNally
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) ( email )
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
IZA Institute of Labor Economics
Schaumburg-Lippe-Str. 7 / 9
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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