Which U.S. Market Interactions Affect CEO Pay? Evidence from U.K. Companies

34 Pages Posted: 11 Jan 2011 Last revised: 11 Jan 2014

Joseph J. Gerakos

Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College

Joseph D. Piotroski

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Suraj Srinivasan

Harvard Business School

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 2012

Abstract

This paper examines how different types of interactions with U.S. markets by non-U.S. firms are associated with higher level of CEO pay, greater emphasis on incentive-based compensation, and smaller pay gap with U.S. firms. Using a sample of CEOs of U.K. firms and using both broad cross-sectional and narrow event-window tests, we find that capital market relationship in the form of an U.S. exchange listing is related to higher U.K CEO pay; however, the effect is similar when U.K. firms have a listing in any foreign country implying a foreign listing effect not unique to the U.S. Product market relationships measured by the extent of sales in the U.S. by U.K. companies are associated with higher pay, greater use of U.S.-style pay arrangements, and a reduction in the U.S.-U.K. pay gap. The product market effect is incremental to the effect of a U.S. exchange listing, the extent of the firm’s non-U.S. foreign market interactions, and the characteristics of the executive. The U.S-U.K. CEO pay gap reduces in U.K. firms that make U.S. acquisitions. Further, the firm’s use of a U.S. compensation consultant increases the sensitivity of U.K. pay practices to U.S. product market relationships.

Keywords: CEO compensation, international pay, globalization, corporate governance, incentives, cross-listing, United Kingdom

JEL Classification: G32, G34, G38

Suggested Citation

Gerakos, Joseph J. and Piotroski, Joseph D. and Srinivasan, Suraj, Which U.S. Market Interactions Affect CEO Pay? Evidence from U.K. Companies (August 2012). Management Science Journal, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1738083 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1738083

Joseph J. Gerakos

Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College ( email )

Hanover, NH 03755
United States

Joseph D. Piotroski

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

Suraj Srinivasan (Contact Author)

Harvard Business School ( email )

Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
United States

HOME PAGE: http://drfd.hbs.edu/fit/public/facultyInfo.do?facInfo=pub&facId=10700

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