Do Firms Buy Their Stock at Bargain Prices? Evidence from Actual Stock Repurchase Disclosures

Forthcoming in Review of Finance

59 Pages Posted: 15 Jan 2011 Last revised: 5 Jun 2013

See all articles by Azi Ben-Rephael

Azi Ben-Rephael

Rutgers Business School - Rutgers University

Jacob Oded

Tel Aviv University - Coller School of Management

Avi Wohl

Tel Aviv University - Coller School of Management

Date Written: June 5, 2013

Abstract

Using new monthly data we investigate open-market repurchase executions of US firms. We find that firms repurchase at prices which are significantly lower than average market prices. This price discount is negatively related to size and positively related to market-to-book ratio. Firms’ repurchase activity is followed by a positive and significant abnormal return. Importantly, the market response occurs when firms disclose their actual repurchase data in earnings announcements, and this positive response is followed by a one month drift. Consistent with these results, we find that insider trading is positively related to actual repurchases.

Keywords: Stock Repurchases, Stock Buybacks, Payout Policy, Timing, Bid-Ask Spread, Liquidity, Insider Trading

JEL Classification: G14, G38, G35

Suggested Citation

Ben-Rephael, Azi and Oded, Jacob and Wohl, Avi, Do Firms Buy Their Stock at Bargain Prices? Evidence from Actual Stock Repurchase Disclosures (June 5, 2013). Forthcoming in Review of Finance, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1738922 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1738922

Azi Ben-Rephael

Rutgers Business School - Rutgers University ( email )

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/abenreph

Jacob Oded (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University - Coller School of Management ( email )

Ramat Aviv
Tel-Aviv, 6997801
Israel

Avi Wohl

Tel Aviv University - Coller School of Management ( email )

P.O. Box 39010
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
+972 3 6409051 (Phone)

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