Deliberation, Disclosure of Information, and Voting

36 Pages Posted: 13 Jan 2011 Last revised: 10 Jul 2012

See all articles by Matthew O. Jackson

Matthew O. Jackson

Stanford University - Department of Economics; Santa Fe Institute; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR)

Xu Tan

University of Washington - Economics

Date Written: June 2012


A set of voters consults experts before voting over two alternatives. Experts observe private signals about the values of the alternatives and can reveal their information or conceal it, but cannot lie. We examine how disclosure and voting vary with preference biases, signal precision, and the voting rule. Unanimity rule can lead to greater information revelation and total utility than simple majority rule. The voting rule that maximizes information disclosure need not coincide with the voting rule that maximizes total utility. In a large enough society, full information revelation is approximated via any voting rule.

Keywords: Voting, Information, Disclosure, Deliberation, Experts, Committees, Sender-Receiver

JEL Classification: D72, D71, D83

Suggested Citation

Jackson, Matthew O. and Tan, Xu, Deliberation, Disclosure of Information, and Voting (June 2012). Available at SSRN: or

Matthew O. Jackson (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
1-650-723-3544 (Phone)


Santa Fe Institute

1399 Hyde Park Road
Santa Fe, NM 87501
United States

Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR) ( email )

180 Dundas Street West, Suite 1400
Toronto, Ontario

Xu Tan

University of Washington - Economics ( email )

Seattle, WA
United States

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