Court Reform in Transitional States: Chile and the Philippines
Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 163-193, June 2010
48 Pages Posted: 16 Jan 2011
Date Written: June 1, 2010
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we argue that democratic institutions are not a prerequisite to an independent judiciary. Rather, the need for foreign investment is a necessary and, in some cases, perhaps sufficient condition for the establishment of at least nominally independent judicial institutions. We consider Chile immediately after Pinochet and the Philippines at the outset of the Marcos regime. We consider the similarity of court reforms implemented by these two regimes. These cases illustrate two distinct points in the life span of an authoritarian government. The Chilean case features the time period that begins a transition to democracy prior to consolidation. The Philippine case features the time period of ascension of the authoritarian. Despite the different environments, both regimes implemented court reforms primarily designed to attract foreign direct investment into their troubled economies.
Keywords: court, reform, court reform, Chile, Philippines, judiciary, transitional states, authoritarian regimes, foreign direct investment
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