Court Reform in Transitional States: Chile and the Philippines

Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 163-193, June 2010

48 Pages Posted: 16 Jan 2011

See all articles by Charles Anthony Smith

Charles Anthony Smith

University of California, Irvine

Mark J. Farrales

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Division of Social Sciences

Date Written: June 1, 2010

Abstract

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we argue that democratic institutions are not a prerequisite to an independent judiciary. Rather, the need for foreign investment is a necessary and, in some cases, perhaps sufficient condition for the establishment of at least nominally independent judicial institutions. We consider Chile immediately after Pinochet and the Philippines at the outset of the Marcos regime. We consider the similarity of court reforms implemented by these two regimes. These cases illustrate two distinct points in the life span of an authoritarian government. The Chilean case features the time period that begins a transition to democracy prior to consolidation. The Philippine case features the time period of ascension of the authoritarian. Despite the different environments, both regimes implemented court reforms primarily designed to attract foreign direct investment into their troubled economies.

Keywords: court, reform, court reform, Chile, Philippines, judiciary, transitional states, authoritarian regimes, foreign direct investment

Suggested Citation

Smith, Charles Anthony and Farrales, Mark Jorgensen, Court Reform in Transitional States: Chile and the Philippines (June 1, 2010). Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 163-193, June 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1739766

Charles Anthony Smith (Contact Author)

University of California, Irvine ( email )

Campus Drive
Irvine, CA 62697-3125
United States

Mark Jorgensen Farrales

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Division of Social Sciences ( email )

United States

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