Hazard Rates and Personal Interdependencies in Supervisory Boards of DAX-Companies

GEABA Discussion Paper No. 10-19

24 Pages Posted: 18 Jan 2011 Last revised: 20 Apr 2020

See all articles by Benjamin Balsmeier

Benjamin Balsmeier

KU Leuven - Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy, and Innovation

Alexander Dilger

University of Münster

Jörg Lingens

University of Münster

Date Written: December 2010

Abstract

We estimate and analyse the hazard rates of members of the supervisory board in German leading companies, listed in the DAX, with a special focus on personal interdependencies with other supervisory boards and executives committees. We find fundamental differences between supervisory board members representing owners and those representing employees. Several variables measuring personal interdependencies are only relevant for the former whereas the latter have a longer tenure if the salary of the executives is higher, which can be interpreted as an indicator of collusion.

Keywords: Co-determination, Corporate Governance, Cox-Model, Hazard Rate, Interdependence, Supervisory Board

JEL Classification: M20, J63, C41

Suggested Citation

Balsmeier, Benjamin and Dilger, Alexander and Lingens, Jörg, Hazard Rates and Personal Interdependencies in Supervisory Boards of DAX-Companies (December 2010). GEABA Discussion Paper No. 10-19, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1741838 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1741838

Benjamin Balsmeier

KU Leuven - Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy, and Innovation ( email )

Naamsestraat 69 bus 3500
Leuven, 3000
Belgium

Alexander Dilger (Contact Author)

University of Münster ( email )

Institute for Organisational Economics
Scharnhorststr. 100
Münster, D-48151
Germany
+49-251-83-25330 (Phone)
+49-251-83-28429 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.wiwi.uni-muenster.de/io/en/organisation/Dilger.html

Jörg Lingens

University of Münster ( email )

Universitätsstr. 14-16
48143 Munster
Germany

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