Hazard Rates and Personal Interdependencies in Supervisory Boards of DAX-Companies
GEABA Discussion Paper No. 10-19
24 Pages Posted: 18 Jan 2011 Last revised: 20 Apr 2020
Date Written: December 2010
Abstract
We estimate and analyse the hazard rates of members of the supervisory board in German leading companies, listed in the DAX, with a special focus on personal interdependencies with other supervisory boards and executives committees. We find fundamental differences between supervisory board members representing owners and those representing employees. Several variables measuring personal interdependencies are only relevant for the former whereas the latter have a longer tenure if the salary of the executives is higher, which can be interpreted as an indicator of collusion.
Keywords: Co-determination, Corporate Governance, Cox-Model, Hazard Rate, Interdependence, Supervisory Board
JEL Classification: M20, J63, C41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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