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Financial Frictions, Investment, and Institutions

47 Pages Posted: 18 Jan 2011  

Stijn Claessens

Bank for International Settlements; University of Amsterdam - Finance Group; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Tinbergen Institute; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Kenichi Ueda

University of Tokyo - Faculty of Economics

Yishay Yafeh

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Jerusalem School of Business Administration; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2010

Abstract

Financial frictions have been identified as key factors affecting both short-term economic fluctuations and long-term growth. An important policy question therefore is whether institutional reforms can reduce financial frictions and, if so, which reforms are best? We address this question by empirically investigating the effects of institutions on financial frictions using a canonical investment model. We consider two channels by which frictions affect investment: (i) through financial transaction costs at the individual firm (micro) level; and (ii) through the required rate of return at the country (macro) level. Using a panel of 75,000 firm-years across 48 countries for the period 1990-2007, we examine how, through these frictions, institutions affect investment. We find that improved corporate governance (e.g., less severe informational problems) and enhanced contractual enforcement reduce financial frictions affecting investment, while stronger creditor rights (e.g., lower collateral constraints) are less important.

Keywords: corporate governance, creditor rights, Financial friction, institutions, investment

JEL Classification: G30, O16, O43

Suggested Citation

Claessens, Stijn and Ueda, Kenichi and Yafeh, Yishay, Financial Frictions, Investment, and Institutions (December 2010). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8170. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1742695

Stijn Claessens (Contact Author)

Bank for International Settlements ( email )

Centralbahnplatz 2
CH-4002 Basel
Switzerland

University of Amsterdam - Finance Group ( email )

Roetersstraat 18
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands
+31 20 525 6020 (Phone)
+31 20 525 5285 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.fee.uva.nl/fm/index.htm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

Tinbergen Institute

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Kenichi Ueda

University of Tokyo - Faculty of Economics ( email )

7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku
Tokyo 113-0033
Japan

Yishay Yafeh

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Jerusalem School of Business Administration ( email )

Mount Scopus
Jerusalem 91905
Israel
+972 2 588 3081 (Phone)
+972 2 588 1341 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://bschool.huji.ac.il/facultye/yafeh/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

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