Lon Fuller and Substantive Natural Law

American Journal of Jurisprudence, Vol. 26, p. 202, 1981

Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 11-04

16 Pages Posted: 22 Jan 2011  

Date Written: January 19, 2011

Abstract

I will contend that Fuller’s secular or “procedural” natural law, as described by Moffat, does not cover the theoretical position that could be occupied by a substantive natural lawyer, that such a theoretical position is viable today, and that there are some key elements in Fuller’s theory that actually conflict with substantive natural law and might therefore be criticized from that perspective.

Keywords: Jurisprudence, Natural Law, Fuller (Lon), Hart, Dworkin, Cicero, Bentham, Austin, Aquinas

JEL Classification: K19, K49

Suggested Citation

D'Amato, Anthony, Lon Fuller and Substantive Natural Law (January 19, 2011). American Journal of Jurisprudence, Vol. 26, p. 202, 1981; Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 11-04. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1743825

Anthony D'Amato (Contact Author)

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law ( email )

375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
151
Rank
159,296
Abstract Views
938