Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Capital-Market Effects of Securities Regulation: Prior Conditions, Implementation, and Enforcement

ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 407/2014

Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 12-04

79 Pages Posted: 23 Jan 2011 Last revised: 6 Apr 2016

Hans Bonde Christensen

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Luzi Hail

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Christian Leuz

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Center for Financial Studies (CFS); University of Pennsylvania - Wharton Financial Institutions Center; CESifo Research Network

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 31, 2016

Abstract

We examine the capital-market effects of changes in securities regulation in the European Union (EU) aimed at reducing market abuse and increasing transparency. To estimate causal effects for the population of EU firms, we exploit that for plausibly exogenous reasons, like national legislative procedures, EU countries adopted these directives at different times. We find significant increases in market liquidity, but the effects are stronger in countries with stricter implementation and traditionally more stringent securities regulation. The findings suggest that countries with initially weaker regulation do not catch up with stronger countries, and that countries diverge more upon harmonizing regulation.

Keywords: Capital market regulation, Enforcement, Disclosure, Law and finance, European Union, Liquidity

JEL Classification: F30, G15, G18, G30, K22, M41

Suggested Citation

Christensen, Hans Bonde and Hail, Luzi and Leuz, Christian, Capital-Market Effects of Securities Regulation: Prior Conditions, Implementation, and Enforcement (March 31, 2016). Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 12-04. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1745105 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1745105

Hans Bonde Christensen

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 South Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Luzi Hail

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States
215-898-8205 (Phone)
215-573-2054 (Fax)

Christian Leuz (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-834-1996 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/christian.leuz/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.nber.org

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Center for Financial Studies (CFS) ( email )

Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

University of Pennsylvania - Wharton Financial Institutions Center

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6218
United States

CESifo Research Network

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Paper statistics

Downloads
3,203
Rank
2,173
Abstract Views
16,308