The Value Theory of Democracy
Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 259-278, October 2006
21 Pages Posted: 24 Jan 2011
Date Written: October 1, 2006
Abstract
Liberal political theorists often argue that justice requires limits on policy outcomes, limits delineated by substantive rights. Distinct from this project is a body of literature dedicated to elaborating on the meaning of democracy in procedural terms. In this article, I offer an alternative to the traditional divide between procedural theories of democracy and substantive theories of justice; I call this the ‘value theory of democracy.’ I argue that the democratic ideal is fundamentally about a core set of values (political autonomy, equality of interests, and reciprocity) with both procedural and substantive implications. Further, I contend that limits on policy outcomes can be newly understood as part of the democratic ideal.
Keywords: democracy, rights, substantive, procedural, Habermas
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Recommended Papers
-
Constitutional Self-Government and Judicial Review: A Reply to Five Critics
-
On the Philosophy of Group Decision Methods I: The Non-Obviousness of Majority Rule
-
Balancing Procedures and Outcomes within Democratic Theory: Core Values and Judicial Review
-
By Gregory Koger and Sergio J. Campos
-
Democracy and Judicial Review: Are They Really Incompatible?