34 Pages Posted: 25 Jan 2011 Last revised: 24 Mar 2011
Date Written: January 24, 2011
This paper identifies two distinctive features of ancient constitutional design that have largely disappeared from the modern world: constitution-making by single individuals and constitution-making by foreigners. We consider the virtues and vices of these features, and argue that under plausible conditions single founders and outsider founders offer advantages over constitution-making by representative bodies of citizens, even in the modern world. We also discuss the implications of adding single founders and outsider founders to the constitutional toolkit by describing how constitutional legitimacy would work, and how constitutional interpretation would be conducted, under constitutions that display either or both of the distinctive features of ancient constitutional design.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Lanni, Adriaan and Vermeule, Adrian, Constitutional Design in the Ancient World (January 24, 2011). Stanford Law Review, Forthcoming; Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 11-06. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1747087