Tying Law in Microsoft I and II: The Secret Art of Magic?

Brussels School of Competition Working Paper Series No. 1/2010

10 Pages Posted: 15 Aug 2011  

Nicolas Petit

University of Liege - School of Law; International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE); University of South Australia - School of Law

Norman Neyrinck

University of Liege

Date Written: November 16, 2010

Abstract

This paper seeks to uncover an inconvenient truth. The Microsoft decisions are not tying cases. Rather, the two decisions taken by the EU Commission against Microsoft – i.e. the Windows Media Player (“WMP”) case of 2004 and the Internet Explorer (“IE”) case of 2009 – mark departures from conventional tying analysis (I). First, they deviate from standard tying law in that in the Microsoft cases, a key component of abusive tying, namely coercion, is missing (II). Second, the Microsoft decisions share many analogies with “essential facility” cases. One may thus question to what extent the Commission has not pursued disguised refusal to supply cases (III).

Keywords: WMP, IE, Windows Media Player, Internet Explorer, Microsoft, Tying, tying, competition law, competition, essential facility, refusal to supply, refusal, supply

Suggested Citation

Petit, Nicolas and Neyrinck, Norman, Tying Law in Microsoft I and II: The Secret Art of Magic? (November 16, 2010). Brussels School of Competition Working Paper Series No. 1/2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1747181 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1747181

Nicolas Petit

University of Liege - School of Law ( email )

B-4000 Liege
Belgium

International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) ( email )

United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.laweconcenter.org/contact.html

University of South Australia - School of Law ( email )

GPO Box 2471
Adelaide SA 5001
Australia

Norman Neyrinck (Contact Author)

University of Liege ( email )

B-4000 Liege
Belgium

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