Individual Rationality and Participation in Large Scale, Multi-Hospital Kidney Exchange

51 Pages Posted: 31 Jan 2011

See all articles by Itai Ashlagi

Itai Ashlagi

Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering

Alvin E. Roth

Dept. of Economics, Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: January 2011

Abstract

As multi-hospital kidney exchange clearinghouses have grown, the set of players has grown from patients and surgeons to include hospitals. Hospitals have the option of enrolling only their hard-to-match patient-donor pairs, while conducting easily arranged exchanges internally. This behavior has already started to be observed.We show that the cost of making it individually rational for hospitals to participate fully is low in almost every large exchange pool (although the worst-case cost is very high), while the cost of failing to guarantee individually rational allocations could be large, in terms of lost transplants. We also identify an incentive compatible mechanism.

Suggested Citation

Ashlagi, Itai and Roth, Alvin E., Individual Rationality and Participation in Large Scale, Multi-Hospital Kidney Exchange (January 2011). NBER Working Paper No. w16720, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1749861

Itai Ashlagi (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering ( email )

473 Via Ortega
Stanford, CA 94305-9025
United States

Alvin E. Roth

Dept. of Economics, Stanford University ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
STANFORD, CA 94305-6072
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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