Efficient Search by Committee

11 Pages Posted: 29 Jan 2011

See all articles by Dirk Bergemann

Dirk Bergemann

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Juuso Valimaki

Helsinki School of Economics; University of Southampton - Division of Economics

Date Written: January 28, 2011

Abstract

This note constructs an efficient mechanism for finding the best candidate for a committee from a sequence of potential candidates. Committee members have independent private values information about the quality of the candidate. The mechanism selects the best candidate according to the standard utilitarian welfare criterion. Furthermore, the mechanism can be modified to have a balanced budget.

Keywords: Search, Committtees, Voting, Mechanism design, Dynamic pivot mechanism

JEL Classification: C72, D43, D82, D83, H41

Suggested Citation

Bergemann, Dirk and Valimaki, Juuso, Efficient Search by Committee (January 28, 2011). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1782. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1750348 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1750348

Dirk Bergemann (Contact Author)

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States
203-432-3592 (Phone)
203-432-2128 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirk/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Juuso Valimaki

Helsinki School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 21210
Helsinki 00100, 00101
Finland

University of Southampton - Division of Economics ( email )

Southampton, SO17 1BJ
United Kingdom
+44 23 8059 3263 (Phone)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
74
rank
313,568
Abstract Views
463
PlumX Metrics