Tacit Collusion: A Solution in Search of a Problem

9 Pages Posted: 31 Jan 2011

See all articles by Michael Zymler

Michael Zymler

University of Cambridge - Downing College; King's College London - The Dickson Poon School of Law

Date Written: October 22, 2010

Abstract

It is argued that, in certain oligopolistic markets, the structural conditions are such that the players on the market will be able to earn supra-competitive profits without having to enter into an agreement or concerted practice thereto. This article outlines the development of the ‘solution’ to the problem of tacit collusion. It will then argue that, while the case-law in this area has put new tools in the armoury of competition regulators, it has failed to actually address the problem of tacit collusion. It will then briefly consider whether tacit collusion is even a problem that ought to concern us in the first place.

Keywords: Tacit Collusion, Article 102, Oligopoly, Italian Flat Glass, Airtours, Laurent Piau

JEL Classification: D43, L4

Suggested Citation

Zymler, Michael, Tacit Collusion: A Solution in Search of a Problem (October 22, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1751545 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1751545

Michael Zymler (Contact Author)

University of Cambridge - Downing College ( email )

Regent St
Cambridge, CB2 1DQ
United Kingdom

King's College London - The Dickson Poon School of Law ( email )

Somerset House East Wing
Strand
London, WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

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