Double Tax Avoidance and Tax Competition for Mobile Capital

54 Pages Posted: 3 Feb 2011

See all articles by Markus Leibrecht

Markus Leibrecht

Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration

Thomas Rixen

University of Bamberg - Department of Political Science

Date Written: February 2, 2011

Abstract

There are two largely distinct bodies of literature and corresponding research areas in international taxation. On the one hand, there is the big and continuously growing body of theoretical and empirical literature on tax competition, mainly in the field of economics; on the other, there is a large body of mostly legal literature dealing with international double tax avoidance. Only very few contributions address both issues at the same time. This article narrows this gap. Specifically, we explain why measures of double tax avoidance may actually act as instruments of tax competition. We outline the principles and rules of international double tax avoidance and explain how they can be used for purposes of tax arbitrage. Moreover we outline why double tax avoidance rules can provide an important institutional foundation for tax competition. After that we review the empirical literature suggestive of the role of double tax avoidance rules in tax competition. Finally, we draw some preliminary policy conclusions.

Suggested Citation

Leibrecht, Markus and Rixen, Thomas, Double Tax Avoidance and Tax Competition for Mobile Capital (February 2, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1753636 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1753636

Markus Leibrecht

Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Augasse 2-6
A-1090 Wien
Austria

Thomas Rixen (Contact Author)

University of Bamberg - Department of Political Science ( email )

Feldkirchenstrasse 21
96045 Bamberg
Germany

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