Comparing Merger Policies in the European Union and the United States

Posted: 4 Feb 2011  

Mats Bergman

Södertörn University, Stockholm

Malcolm B. Coate

U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC)

Maria Jakobsson

Stockholm University - Department of Economics

Shawn W. Ulrick

U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC)

Date Written: July 23, 2010

Abstract

We collect a sample of EU and US merger investigations, estimate models of the regulatory decisions, and use the models to compare merger policies. Our approach allows us to decompose observed differences into policy effects and case-mix effects. Focusing on dominance mergers, we find that the EU is tougher than the US on average, in particular for mergers resulting in moderate market shares. However, the US appears to be more aggressive for coordinated interaction and nondominance unilateral effects cases. Overall, our analysis detects substantial differences in policies, but it does not classify one regime as being more aggressive than the other.

Keywords: Antitrust, Comparative Regulatory Policy, Merger Policy, Oaxaca Decomposition

JEL Classification: L44 , K21

Suggested Citation

Bergman, Mats and Coate, Malcolm B. and Jakobsson, Maria and Ulrick, Shawn W., Comparing Merger Policies in the European Union and the United States (July 23, 2010). Review of Industrial Organization, Vol. 36, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1754517

Mats A. Bergman

Södertörn University, Stockholm ( email )

Alfred Nobels allé 7, Flemingsberg
Stockholm, Stockholm 14189
Sweden

Malcolm B. Coate (Contact Author)

U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) ( email )

601 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20580
United States

Maria Jakobsson

Stockholm University - Department of Economics ( email )

S-10691 Stockholm
Sweden

Shawn W. Ulrick

U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) ( email )

600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20580
United States

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