13 Pages Posted: 4 Feb 2011
Date Written: February 3, 2011
The new Horizontal Merger Guidelines, if treated by courts as a source of law, would reduce the discretion traditionally exercised by courts in defining relevant markets and market power in merger cases. This is an undesirable shift in the balance of power because courts have used the market power inquiry stage of merger analysis as a general checkpoint or weigh station for evaluating factors relevant to the welfare effects of a merger.
Keywords: horizontal merger guidelines, Clayton Act Section 7, Brown Shoe, market definition, market power, error cost analysis, relevant market, pricing power, industrial rationalization
JEL Classification: K21, K22, K23, K29
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Hylton, Keith N., Brown Shoe Versus the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (February 3, 2011). Review of Industrial Organization, 2011; Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 11-05. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1754565